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The Community Reinvestment
Act (CRA), the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, and the Fair
Housing Act all assign a key
role to the formal banking
sector, based on the view that it is vital for
poor and ethnic minority sections of society to
have access to banks and other mainstream
financial institutions.  The usual regulatory
view rarely considers alternatives to the formal
banking sector, contributing to the impression
that rejected bank loan applicants and nonap-
plicants are left to fend for themselves, perhaps
vulnerable to loan sharks and pawn merchants
of dubious repute.
It is beginning to be noticed, both theoreti-
cally and empirically, that such an extreme
view cannot be supported.  In this context, we
seek to document not only the actual use of
banks, but also the widespread use of alterna-
tive financing mechanisms, using data from a
survey of households and businesses in a His-
panic neighborhood of Chicago.1 Our purpose
is to present the salient facts, together with
what we view to be reasonable interpretations,
and to clearly delineate the boundary of our
existing knowledge.  In broad terms, this arti-
cle adds to the existing literature concerning
the actual and potential role of banks in disad-
vantaged communities.
In recent years, there has been a surge of
interest in the issue of whether banks and other
formal financial institutions are effectively
serving poor and ethnic minority sections of
U.S. society.  The associated empirical litera-
ture has tended to focus on the volume of bank
lending in certain neighborhoods or to certain
groups.  While this approach has value, it suf-
fers, to some extent, from a failure to address
the reasons why an individual would actually
desire a bank loan.  Given that informal alterna-
tives to banks do exist, the volume of total bank
lending may not be the best indicator of the
availability of credit within communities.  Start-
ing with a theoretical examination of underlying
motives for borrowing, we reconsider the issue
of credit provision in a context that admits the
existence of informal community-based alterna-
tives.  To achieve this, we make use of the ex-
tensive data set from the 1994–95 Little Village
Surveys of households and businesses, conduct-
ed in South Lawndale (popularly known as the
Little Village), a principally Hispanic communi-
ty on the southwest side of Chicago.
Modern economic theory has done much
to clarify why individuals borrow and save.
Ideally, people would like to insure themselves
against all fluctuations in income, paying out
money when times are good and receiving
money when times are bad.  If insurance is
unavailable (and clearly complete insurance
against all fluctuations is not available), people
can insulate themselves partially from income
changes by borrowing and saving, effectively
transferring resources from periods of high
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income to periods of low income.  This also
implies that individuals will generally prefer
loan contracts that offer at least some provi-
sion for default, effectively giving limited
insurance against bad times.  Similar reason-
ing applies to a consideration of optimal loan
contracts to finance one-time capital invest-
ments, such as those entailed in house purchase
or business financing.
Related theories have shown the impor-
tance of information in actually implementing
loan or insurance contracts in the face of moral
hazard incentive problems.  One branch of
research has suggested that financial intermedi-
aries essentially owe their existence to their
role as “information machines” that effectively
minimize the costs of information creation.
However, this research has yet to produce
compelling reasons why intermediaries should
take the form of formal institutions.  The role
of credit in helping individuals to insulate them-
selves against periods of low income or high
expenditure requirements makes effective access
to credit an issue of considerable importance.
Similarly, the potential for self-employment to
provide a route out of poverty has led to fresh
interest in the problems of small business fi-
nancing.  Working from the theoretical frame-
work outlined above, we put forward the fol-
lowing research questions:
(1) To what extent are individuals able to
buffer themselves against changes
in income?
(2) How available is financing for small busi-
ness enterprises?
(3) What sources of credit are actually used?
(4) Do individuals prefer some sources of
credit over others, perhaps related to the
type of loan contract offered?  Or are some
groups of individuals denied access to
some sources?
These questions were central to the design
and execution of the Little Village Surveys.
Given the concern among the public as to
whether banks are serving the poor and ethnic
minorities effectively, these questions take on a
heightened importance when addressed to a
relatively poor urban Mexican community.
In this article, we use the results of the
survey to attempt to answer these questions.
We find that there is widespread use of credit
by both households and incipient businesses.
Nonetheless, many households are not fully
insulated from income fluctuations, and busi-
nesses appear credit-constrained, in the sense
that higher start-up investments lead to more
than proportionally higher profits.  Moreover,
most of the credit is provided by informal
sources, such as families and friends.  More
contentiously, we find evidence that the small
role of the formal financial sector is at least
partly attributable to a lack of interest from
the community.  Reconciling this finding with
the apparent lack of overall credit leads us to
speculate that the loan instruments offered by
the formal sector may not be particularly
attractive, and that improvements may be
possible by using or replicating informal com-
munity networks.
Below, we provide a more detailed sum-
mary of the theoretical background for the
Little Village Surveys.  This is followed by a
two-part discussion of the actual findings of
the survey—the first part dealing with the
household section of the survey and the second
dealing with the business section.
Theoretical overview
Why do individuals wish to borrow or save?
In a world of perfect information and com-
pletely specifiable and enforceable contracts
(and without transaction costs), individuals
would buy insurance against all noneconomy-
wide risks such as an individual income drop or
the death or illness of a family member.2  In
technical terms, marginal utility of consumption
would remain constant even in the face of idio-
syncratic shocks.3  In practice, such insurance
may be offered in part through provisions (ei-
ther explicitly stated or implicitly understood)
for default or repayment rescheduling in loan
contracts.4  The influential permanent-income
model of Milton Friedman (1957) demonstrates
then even if only noncontingent borrowing and
saving are possible, individuals will be able to
significantly insulate consumption from income
fluctuations.  In contrast, if only saving is possi-
ble, individuals will be forced to accumulate
buffer stocks to guard against hard times, and
are likely to suffer a financial setback when
savings are low or nonexistent.5  We do not
address here longer-term motives for saving,
such as those suggested by bequest or life-cycle
models (briefly, the latter postulates that indi-
viduals borrow when young, then repay and
save for retirement when middle-aged and their
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Aside from these insurance and smoothing
motives, clearly people also borrow and save to
finance lump-sum capital costs, such as those
incurred in house purchase or business start-up.
The complex questions of why and which
individuals would want to engage in these
activities are left undeveloped here, though it
should be noted that credit constraints in busi-
ness financing may have far reaching implica-
tions in terms of occupational choice, intergen-
erational mobility, and even economy-wide
productivity and growth, as discussed by Evans
and Jovanovic (1989) and by Lloyd-Ellis and
Bernhardt (1993), among others.
Why does intermediation arise?
It is by no means obvious why institutions
arise that specialize in the provision of lending
and other insurance services.  In a world of
perfect information, individuals would simply
write contracts directly with each other.  Theo-
ries of intermediation typically depend on
information being available only at a cost:
Intermediaries arise either because they mini-
mize the amount of information production
(that is, not all individuals need to do it) or
because they have lower costs of intermedia-
tion production than other agents.  Key papers
in this field include Diamond (1984), Krasa
and Villamil (1991), and Boyd and Prescott
(1986).  However, the first two force a formal
structure on the intermediary by allowing at
most one central point of information collec-
tion per intermediary, while the latter does not
distinguish convincingly between a formal
structure and an informal network linking
individuals.  In summary, there are no estab-
lished theoretical reasons for supposing that
when intermediation exists it will take the form
of a formal institution.6
Why might intermediaries have difficulty
serving some communities?
If loan production requires resources other
than the opportunity cost of capital, it might
simply be too costly to lend to poor or margin-
alized individuals at standard interest rates.  If
such individuals are geographically clustered,
this will translate into little lending activity
within certain communities.  However, it is not
clear that loan production involves costs that
are not proportional to loan value, nor is it
clear that a lender could not recover such costs
by charging higher interest rates for small
loans or “costly” borrowers.
Some theories of intermediation predict
credit rationing, in the sense that some individ-
uals are denied loans even though other indi-
viduals with identical qualifications are granted
loans, or that individuals would like to borrow
more at posted interest rates.7  Clearly, if it
existed, such rationing might take place along
community lines, perhaps to economize on
acquiring specific knowledge of different com-
munities.8  Credit rationing may greatly exag-
gerate what would otherwise be marginal vari-
ables in the loan-application process—that is,
if some essentially identical individuals must
be rejected, tiny differences in the cost of loan
provision could produce huge differences in
outcomes.  Aghion and Bolton (1992), Lehnert,
Ligon, and Townsend (1996), and Piketty
(1994), have exhibited models in which moral
hazard problems may be more acute at low
wealth levels and, consequently, poor individu-
als may face higher interest rates or even be cut
out of the loan market completely.  Finally,
consideration must be given to the view that
some lenders are closed-minded or racist and,
hence, simply do not like to lend to minority
segments of society.
We would note that no theory of bank
unwillingness to lend can be supported or re-
futed by a simple count of bank rejections.  If
the application process is costly and people
understand the process by which banks oper-
ate, applicants likely to be rejected will not
apply.  Theoretically, given the extensive self-
selection and prescreening of actual bank ap-
plicants, only “information surprises” in the
loan process should lead to rejections.  In this
sense, the emphasis on minority rejection ratios
as reported in Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
(HMDA) data, in the Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston study (1992), and in matched-pairs
regulatory analysis seems a little misplaced.
More consideration must be given to who is
actually applying for bank loans, an issue that
is tightly connected with the existence of fi-
nancing alternatives.
Why some communities may have less need of
formal intermediation
A different explanation for the lack of
formal financial intermediation in some envi-
ronments is that individuals or groups outside
the formal sector may have cheaper access to
relevant information about a borrower and/or
more effective enforcement mechanisms.ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 6
In such cases, informal arrangements may offer
more attractive loan/insurance packages than
formal intermediaries.  Capital from the formal
financial sector may therefore be unnecessary.
Another possibility is the use of explicit group
lending schemes, either for screening or en-
forcement purposes.9  Capital may enter the
community through a small number of individu-
als, who recycle the money through informal
and semiformal networks.  These theories sug-
gest that far from being ignored by banks, poor
and minority communities may be choosing not
to use their services.  A much improved under-
standing of credit markets and institutions, both
formal and informal, is needed to study this
class of theories.
Below, we begin our discussion of the
results of the Little Village Surveys with the
household survey.  We detail sampling proce-
dures and report summary statistics of the sur-
vey populations.  We then address household
financial shocks, consumption smoothing, and
house-buying activity.  This section is followed
by a discussion of the survey findings for Little
Village businesses.  We report sources of small
business start-up financing.  We then attempt to
relate start-up capital to profits and to explain
cross-ethnic differences in start-up costs.  A
recurring theme throughout is that, with the
important exception of house-buying, formal
financial institutions play a very limited role.
The household survey
For the household segment of the survey,
blocks from within the South Lawndale neigh-
borhood were first drawn at random.  A sample
of households was then constructed by drawing
randomly from a complete enumeration of
dwellings within these blocks.  Bilingual inter-
viewers successfully conducted the survey in
73 percent of the households in this sample
(allowing for vacancies), yielding a total of
327 completed interviews.
Of the primary respondents,10  43.6 percent
were male and 56.4 percent female; ages
ranged from 17 to 90, with a mean of 37.7; the
majority (63.0 percent) were married, 8.9 per-
cent were in married-like relationships, 4.0
percent were widowed, 16.0 percent divorced,
6.7 percent separated, and the remaining 12.5
percent were single.
Respondents were overwhelmingly (92.3
percent) Hispanic.  Of the remainder, 4.0 per-
cent were white, 1.5 percent African-American,
and 1.8 percent Arab.  A big majority (78.2
percent) were born in Mexico, with most of the
remainder (19.3 percent) born in the U.S.  For
those born in Mexico, the average length of
time in the U.S. was 15.3 years.  Of the whole
sample, 21.9 percent described themselves as
being very proficient in spoken English, 23.1
percent as being moderately proficient, and
54.9 percent as not being proficient.  The com-
parable figures for Hispanics only are 18.0
percent, 25.0 percent, and 57 percent.  For
written English, the whole sample figures are
14.0 percent, 20.3 percent, and 65.7 percent,
and for Hispanics only, 14.0 percent, 20.8
percent, and 65.2 percent.
Formal educational achievement appears
low.  Of the total sample, 23.9 percent have a
high school diploma, 3.1 percent a degree from
a junior college, 2.5 percent a BA, and 4.9 per-
cent a technical degree.  The low number having
high school diplomas may partially reflect dif-
ferences in the Mexican education system.
The principal occupational responses for
men and women, respectively, were as follows:
wage employment (78.2 percent, 39.3 percent),
self-employed (8.4 percent, 1.6 percent), unem-
ployed (5.6 percent, 4.9 percent), keeping house
(0 percent, 44.3 percent), and retired (6.3 per-
cent, 5.5 percent).11  The proportion of male
respondents who described themselves as self-
employed is high compared with the 1990 cen-
sus figures for Chicago Hispanics—3.1 percent
for men (and 1.7 percent for women).  The
national figures for self-employment among
Mexicans are 6.8 percent for men and 4.4 per-
cent for women, compared with 10.8 percent
and 5.8 percent for the whole population.12
The distribution of reported household
income is low, as shown in table 1.  The medi-









Note: Observations = 307; remaining
respondents did not answer this question.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 7






of relatives 127 (38.8)
Unemployment or




at least one problem 210 (64.2)
Notes: Number in parentheses indicates percent of
whole sample.
Because multiple responses are considered,
sum of responses is greater than total
households responding.
relatives” (114).  Given these responses, it
would be hard to argue that households are
simply unaware of the possibility of obtaining
a bank loan or that they regard bank loans as
impossible to obtain.
Fact 3:  In practice, when faced with actu-
al financial difficulties, bank loans are little
used compared to other options.  Table 3 dis-
plays the full list of cited responses to the diffi-
culties outlined in table 2.  There is extensive
use of existing savings and assets.  There is
also widespread use of “new” sources of fi-
nance, with 124 respondents (58.5 percent of
those responding) using at least one such
source other than transfer payments.14  Howev-
er, only 25 of these households obtained credit
from a source described as a “bank or individu-
al”.15  Of these responses, 14 refer to banks,
four to finance companies, three to credit




Financial response (new source)
Borrowed from banks or individualsa 25 (11.8)
Gifts or other assistance from relativesa 68 (32.1)
Borrowed from friendsa 59 (27.8)
Gifts or assistance from friendsa 28 (13.2)
Borrowed from ethnic associationa 17 (8.0)
Used credit cards 5 (2.4)
Transferred payments 28 (13.2)
Received money/food from community organization 1 (0.5)
Financial response (existing assets)
Used cash or household savingsa 76 (35.8)
Sold assetsa 17 (8.0)
Delayed or failed to pay debtsa 66 (31.1)
Labor response
Worked harder/increased hoursa 88 (41.5)
Got other job to tide overa 46 (21.7)
Put other family members to worka 25 (11.8)
Consumption response
Reduced household consumption expendituresa 97 (45.8)
Other
Received nonmonetary help from relatives 2 (0.9)
Somebody else will pay 1 (0.5)
Other 20 (9.4)
None, because it did not cause economic problems 14 (6.6)
Migration 1 (0.5)
Total number of households responding 212
aResponse explicitly mentioned as an option in the questionnaire.
Notes: Number in parentheses indicates percent of those responding.
Because multiple responses are considered, sum of responses is
greater than total households responding.
$22,260 for the same neighbor-
hood, cited in the 1992 Community
Lending Factbook (1992).  The
same source gives the city-wide
median as $26,301.  Mean income
for the extended Chicago metropol-
itan area is considerably higher.
Use of consumer credit and savings
The survey results indicate that
approximately two-thirds of house-
holds interviewed had suffered
financial difficulties in the last five
years.  As predicted by theories
such as the permanent-income
model, there is widespread use of
credit to reduce drops in consump-
tion in these periods.  However,
despite widespread awareness of
the possibility of bank credit, this
option is little used in practice.  We
start by detailing these findings:
Fact 1:  Financial difficulties
are prevalent.  Of the sample, 210
households (64.2 percent) reported
having experienced a problem that
caused financial difficulties in the
last five years.  Table 2 displays the
principal problems cited.13
Fact 2:  When faced with a
hypothetical need to borrow mon-
ey, obtaining a bank loan is the
popular response.  A total of 139
households cited this response,
more even than “personal savings”
(133) and “gifts and loans fromECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 8
TABLE 4
Additional use of financial responses
Borrowed Did not borrow
from bank or from bank or
individual lender individual lender
Gifts or other assistance from relatives 6 (24.0) 62 (62.6)
Borrowed from friends 6 (24.0) 53 (53.3)
Gifts or assistance from friends 1 (4.0) 27 (27.3)
Borrowed from ethnic association 2 (8.0) 15 (15.2)
Used credit cards 1 (4.0) 4 (4.0)
Received money/food from community organization 0 (0) 1 (1.0)
Only one new financial source 10 (40.0) 47 (47.5)
Used cash or household savings 3 (12.0) 40 (40.4)
Sold assets 1 (4.0) 9 (9.1)
Delayed or failed to pay debts 4 (16.0) 99 (39.4)
Total 25 99
Notes: Restricted to those using at least one source of new finance.
Number in parentheses indicates percent of total.
Because multiple responses are considered, sum of responses is greater
than total households responding.
TABLE 5
Use of nonfinancial responses
No new New financial
financial response, not from Loan from
response bank or lender bank or lender
Worked harder/increased hours 32 (36.4) 41 (41.4) 15 (60.0)
Got other job to tide over 18 (20.5) 22 (22.2) 6 (24.0)
Put other family members to work 7 (8.0) 15 (15.1) 3 (12.0)
Reduced household consumption expenditures 41 (46.6) 47 (47.4) 9 (36.0)
Total 88 99 25
Notes: Number in parentheses indicates percent of total.
Because multiple responses are considered, sum of responses is greater
than total households responding.
unions, one to an unrelated individual (charg-
ing an undisclosed interest rate on a $4,000
loan), and one each to a mortgage company,
workplace, and “other” source.16  Hence 19 of
the 25 households are borrowing from what we
would describe as a “formal” institution.17
Table 4 shows how the use of financial
responses differs between those who use a bank
or individual lender and those who obtain new
finance from other sources.  For both groups, it
is common to obtain only one new financial
source.  It is comparatively rare for people bor-
rowing more from a bank or lender to also be
liquidating funds and defaulting on debt.
Table 5 shows that compared to those not
making a “new” financial response and  those
making a response but not from a bank or lend-
er, those borrowing from a bank or lender are
more likely to work harder but less likely to
reduce household consumption.  Hence, they
are more likely to pass tests for consumption
smoothing.  The response patterns of the other
two groups are broadly similar.  A possible
interpretation is that loans from a bank or lend-
er are used only in the face of relatively severe
financial difficulties and, in these cases, direct
financial help must be supplemented with an
increase in labor effort.
Table 6 gives details of loans and gifts by
source.  Note that the mean loan amounts from
family and friends are small compared with
those from other sources, but so are the interestFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 9
TABLE 6
Details of financial assistance
Immediate family Other family Friend
Response Loans Gifts Loans Gifts Loans Gifts
Number 39 28 18 6 58 8
Mean amount (dollars) 724 998 631 320 618 360
Mean interest (percent) .15 0 0
Collateral required 0 0 1
Mean collateral/loan na na 10
Other individual Community organization Bank
Response Loans Gifts Loans Gifts Loans Gifts
Number 3 2 3 15
Mean amount (dollars) 1,572 1,250 75 (1) 8,960
Mean interest (percent) 0 2 7.0
Collateral required 0 0 3
Mean collateral/loan na 2.53
Response Credit union Finance company Government agency
Loans Gifts Loans Gifts Loans Gifts
Number 3 4 3
Mean amount (dollars) 3,167 4,925 370
Mean interest (percent) 11 22 (1)
Collateral required 1
Mean collateral/loan 5
Mortgage company Place of work Other
Response Loans Gifts Loans Gifts Loans Gifts
Number 1 1 1 2
Mean amount (dollars) 7,000 2,200 700 205
Mean interest (percent) 7.9 0 0
Collateral required 1
Mean collateral/loan 7.1
Note:  Numbers in parentheses indicate response rate when low.
rates (many are zero).  We would also note
there is a general absence of collateral require-
ments.  As we might expect, “formal” loans are
bigger and have positive interest rates.  This
begs the question whether such loans are avail-
able only in large sizes (either because small
ones entail excessive transaction costs or be-
cause the type of applicant who would want a
small loan is excluded from the financial sec-
tor).18  Figure 1 displays how responses vary
across groups defined using various character-
istics.  In all cases, the sample is restricted to
those households that reported some form of
financial difficulty.
Figure 1 stratifies respondents by quartile
household income.19  The lowest income group
has a markedly stronger tendency to receive at
least one form of “new” financial assistance,
though it appears that the relatively poor are
also less likely to obtain assistance from a bank
or lender.  On the other hand, the relatively
well-off appear less likely to receive assistance
from friends.
Figure 2 displays a stratification by verbal
proficiency in English.20  Incidence of bank or
lender loans seems positively correlated with
proficiency in English, and assistance from
friends negatively correlated.
Figure 3 stratifies respondents by house-
buying activity.21  Having used a formal-sector
loan to buy a house markedly increases the
incidence of borrowing from a bank or lender,
but owning a house acquired without a formal
loan appears to have little effect.  Since one
would imagine that a house provides ampleECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 10
FIGURE 1
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Note: 1 = less than $12,000; 2 = $12,000-18,720; 3 = $18,720-30,000; 4 = $30,000 and above.
Sample restricted to those who had suffered financial problems.
FIGURE 2
Stratified by verbal proficiency in English
Notes: 1 = not proficient, 2 = moderately proficient, 3 = very proficient.
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Figure 4 stratifies respondents by a “link”
index, giving the use of services outside the
neighborhood.22   The greater the value of this
index, the more services are used outside the
community, giving some indication of integra-
tion into “mainstream” Chicago.  There is
(perhaps) a small positive correlation of this
index with the use of bank and lender loans
and, intriguingly, a substantial negative corre-
lation with the use of assistance from friends.
collateral with which to obtain a consumption
loan, this finding gives evidence that at least
some people may simply prefer not to borrow
from a bank or other lender.  However, those
households that acquired a house without a
formal loan also appear reluctant to take any
form of financial assistance, suggesting that
they simply have little need or willingness to
borrow from anyone, whether formal institu-
tion, family member, or friend.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 11
FIGURE 3
Stratified by housing market activity
Notes: 1 = no house, 2 = house without formal loan, 3 = house with formal loan.
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The fact that higher income, greater En-
glish proficiency, house ownership, and use of
services outside the neighborhood all have
more or less similar effects on the pattern of
financial assistance reflects in part a substan-
tial positive covariance in these variables.
Nonetheless, the question remains why the
group of people so defined (roughly, in fact,
those who might be thought to most resemble
white Americans) make more use of banks
and lenders and less use of loans from friends
in periods of financial distress.  We propose
the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1:  Only these people have
access to the bank, for some subset of the rea-
sons suggested earlier.
Hypothesis 2:  These people would like to
borrow from informal sources offering more
flexible contracts, but cannot do so because
FIGURE 4
Stratified by community link index
Notes: 1 indicates link = 0; 2 indicates link = 1; 3 indicates link = 2,3; 4 indicates link = 4-9.
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(a) Informal loans are small because of a lack
of lending funds within the informal net-
work, whereas high-income people have
greater borrowing requirements, and/or
(b) Informal loans are not available to them
because community funds are limited and
the relatively well-off or integrated are
given the lowest priority in their alloca-
tion, and/or
(c) Informal loans are not available to them
because the very act of becoming more
wealthy or integrated has reduced their
community links.
We have been unable decisively to accept
or reject any of these hypotheses.  Without a
model of who is actually able to obtain formal-
sector assistance if desired, it is impossible to
distinguish between individuals shunning the
formal sector and the formal sector shunning
individuals.  The development of the necessary
model would presumably require a probit-type
estimation on a large sample of bank accept/
reject decisions, using detailed personal data
on the individuals involved.23  It is worth high-
lighting that only hypothesis 1 would justify
intervention efforts to increase the volume of
traditional bank lending activity in “marginal-
ized” communities, whereas both (a) and (b) of
hypothesis 2 would suggest that banks and
other lending institutions should attempt to
channel capital through either existing or “con-
structed” community networks.  We conclude
that the task of explaining the stratification
documented here is one of some importance.
More generally, with regard to involve-
ment with the formal financial sector, we were
surprised to find that only 70 households (21.3
percent) reported having a checking account.24
As before, these households are likely to be of
higher income and greater proficiency in En-
glish.  Even among the 14 households that had
obtained bank loans in times of financial diffi-
culty, six reported not having a checking ac-
count.  This finding gives some support to the
view that Little Village residents may prefer to
avoid using the formal financial sector, though
other explanations are certainly possible.25  In
contrast, 50.5 percent of the sample reported
having a savings account, suggesting that re-
spondents are able to access the formal sector
when it is beneficial to do so.26
House-buying credit
A total of 136 households (41.6 percent)
live in houses that are either their own or be-
long to their family.27  The current reported
market values of houses range from $32,000 to
$200,000, with a mean of $95,442.  For the
TABLE 7
Sources of house financing
Mean Mean Mean
Lender No. interest Range loan Range income Range
(percent) (percent) (dollars) (dollars) (dollars) (dollars)
Individual 7 4.0 (5) 0–11 34,500 (6) 5,000–70,000 25,786 (7) 9,000–38,000
Bank 68 7.92 (52) 0–14 41,924 (65) 3,000–112,000 29,572 (64) 10,500–76,000
Finance co. 5 8.8 (5) 5–14 62,900 (5) 19,500–129,000 25,500 (5) 8,500–39,000
Seller’s credit 1 7 (1) 105,000 (1) 36,000 (1)
Mortgage co. 6 6.67 (6) 4–9 70,167 (6) 18,000–125,000 54,375 (6) 19,500–160,000
Govt agency 2 7.5 (2) 6–9 75,000 (2) 70,000–80,000 29,600 (2) 19,200–40,000
Credit union 1 15,000 (1) 20,000 (1)
Workplace 1 11 (1) 3,000 (1) 50,000 (1)
Tanda, etc. 2 5.5 (2) 0–11 14,000 (2) 3,000–25,000 15,250 (2) 13,500–17,000
Undeclared 1 0 (1) 25,000 (1) 27,500 (1)
Other 1 9 (1) 110,000 (1) 13,500 (1)
None mentioned 23 27,494 (18) 8,000–75,000
Total 118 7.39 (77) 0–14 44,625 (92) 2,000–129,000 29,847 (108) 8,000–160,000
Notes: Number in parentheses indicates reported observations used to construct means.
Three household had substantial loans from two different sources:
Household 773 took loans of $85,000 from a finance company and $65,000 from a bank.
Household 826 took loans of $48,000 from a bank and $46,000 from another bank.
Household 660 took loans of $59,000 from a bank and $17,000 from a sibling.
Figures relate only to single largest loan used by each household.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 13
118 households that had bought their house,
table 7 displays details of the largest loan used
in the financing process.
Clearly, the majority of house-buying
activity is financed by banks or other formal
institutions (such as finance or mortgage com-
panies).  There is also some use of smaller
loans from individuals, presumably to finance
required down-payments.28  Ten households
appear to fit this pattern.  There is also some
use of loans from individuals as the only credit
source—table 8 gives details of the seven indi-
vidual lenders involved.
Of the 23 households that did not mention
any credit source, 15 appear to have financed
their house purchase entirely from personal
savings.29  Considering these 15 cases, togeth-
er with the eight that obtained loans from
individuals, it appears that at least some
households are able to access large sources of
funds without borrowing from the formal
sector.  It is not clear how widespread this
ability is, nor whether personal savings and
loans from the “informal” sector are the pre-
ferred options or merely the only options for
households that face difficulties accessing the
formal sector.
In a separate section of the
questionnaire, respondents were
asked if they had applied for a
mortgage in the last five years.
The reported rejection rate is
seven out of 34 cases (17.9 per-
cent).  This appears relatively
(though not exceptionally) high,
compared with a 12.9 percent rate
for whites, a 15.4 percent rate for
Hispanics, and a 23.6 percent rate
for African-Americans in Chicago
overall, and an 11.0 percent rate
for whites and a 30.7 percent rate
for African-Americans and Hispanics com-
bined in Munnell et al. (1992).30  For Hispanic
applicants only, table 9 splits the rejection rates
by reported ethnicity of the loan officer con-
tacted: It offers no direct evidence to support a
racial prejudice explanation of rejection.  A
serious consideration of this matter would be
considerably more complicated.  For instance,
it has been suggested that those minority indi-
viduals with credit problems tend to apply to
banks that they perceive to be “soft” on minor-
ities.  The result could be apparently high re-
jection rates for minorities at precisely those
banks that have made the most effort to remove
racial prejudice from the application process.
We would emphasize that because a great deal
of self-selection and sorting occurs before indi-
viduals formally apply for bank loans, any sim-
ple analysis of rejection rates is problematic.
Table 10 displays housing outcomes for
the seven households that had experienced
rejection when applying for a mortgage.  Of
these cases, five households had nonetheless
succeeded in purchasing a house, and three of
these appear to have successfully reapplied for
a loan of the same size within the formal sec-
tor.  Only the remaining two households were
still renting when the survey was
conducted.  Evidently a mortgage
rejection, while commonplace,
does not preclude the applicant
from later purchasing a house.
Business survey
In addition to households, the
Little Village Surveys interviewed
approximately one-third of all




Household ID Relation Loan size Interest
(dollars) (percent)
521 Agent 65,000 11
559 Stepparent Not revealed 0
580 Sibling 15,000 0
585 Sibling 5,000 Not revealed
625 None 70,000 9
664 Parent 35,000 0







institution contact 16 5 23.8
Non-Hispanic
institution contact 10 2 16.7
Total 26 7 21.2ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 14
The survey sample was constructed by first
(tediously) canvassing and enumerating all
existing businesses.  A stratified random subset
was then drawn, including relatively common
businesses at a rate of 35 percent, relatively
uncommon businesses at a rate of 100 percent,
and all other businesses at a rate of 50 per-
cent.31  Note that professional services (such as
legal and medical services) were excluded
from the survey on the grounds that formal
requirements result in the entrance and financ-
ing decisions for these sectors having little in
common with those of other small businesses.32
The businesses in this selected sample were
then surveyed by bilingual interviewers (Span-
ish-English and Korean-English as appropriate)
and a 70 percent response rate achieved, yield-
ing 204 completed interviews.  Additionally,
31 of 120 booths in a discount mall were suc-
cessfully surveyed, yielding a final sample size
of 235 businesses.  Note that in the findings we
present here, we have not adjusted for the sam-
pling ratios—such adjustments appear to have
little impact and, in many cases, the cell sizes
are so small as to make such adjustments con-
ceptually problematic.
Table 11 details ownership ethnicity and
type of business, and more or less supports the
popular perceptions that strip mall and clothing
stores are owned mostly by Asians, industries
are small in number and owned by white
Americans, and food businesses are owned
almost exclusively by Hispanics.33
Reported start-up financing costs vary
widely.  Figure 5 displays a histogram of
start-up costs, revealing that they follow an
TABLE 11
Ethnic and business type composition of sample
Resident Nonresident
Hispanic Hispanic White Asian Arab Total
Clothing 3 1 1 6 11
Food/produce 21 4 1 2 28
Restaurant 13 6 1 20
Hair salon 7 10 1 18
Bar 7 1 2 10
Auto 6 8 1 15
Iron 2 2
Bridal 4 1 5
Bakery 2 3 5
Industry 1 2 3
Wholesale 2 1 1 4
Residual 39 27 9 5 3 83
Mall 6 5 15 5 31
Total 110 69 18 28 10 235
TABLE 10
Final outcomes for households suffering rejection when applying for a mortgage
Previous Application Successful Application
Household ID Own/rent application to amount application to amount
(dollars) (dollars)
513 Own Bank 10,000 Workplace 3,000
551 Own Bank 57,000 Bank 57,000
718 Own Bank 67,000 Bank 67,000
754 Own Bank 120,000 Individual 17,000
812 Own Mortgage 44,000 Bank 44,000
582 Rent Finance 5,000
778 Rent Finance 3,500FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 15
Sources of business start-up
financing
Formal loans are used strik-
ingly little in financing business
start-ups.  We would note the
following:
Fact 1:  Bank financing is
little used, as indicated in table 13.
Fact 2:  Of the 27 businesses
that did use bank loans, only 10
used a loan from some other
source.  This may suggest that for
those who actually obtain bank
loans, such loans are the preferred
option.  Another interpretation
would be that banks are reluctant
to be one of several creditors,
perhaps because of complications
in recovering assets in cases of
bankruptcy.
Fact 3:  Rejection rates for
bank loans are relatively high.  The data in
table 14 suggest that for resident Hispanics, it
may be at least 12/28 (42.9 percent).36  Howev-
er, it is not clear whether rejection is a particu-
larly bad outcome.  Table 15 details the final
business outcomes for those individuals whose







$1.5 million case excluded
Note: Mean = $37,531 (including $1.5 million case)
1,000 100,000 500,000 10,000
TABLE 12
Start-up dates of current businesses
Resident Nonresident
Hispanic Hispanic White Asian Arab Total
1955-59 1 1
1960-64 1 1 2
1965-69 5 4 9
1970-74 3 4 1 8
1975-79 9 6 5 1 1 22
1980-84 10 5 4 1 20
Total before 1985 28 16 15 2 1 62
1985 2 4 1 1 8
1986 8 6 1 1 16
1987 5 4 1 2 1 13
1988 5 1 6
1989 14 4 1 1 20
1990 8 7 2 1 18
1991 12 6 11 1 30
1992 12 6 4 2 24
1993 8 9 2 2 21
1994 7 7 14
1995 1 2 3
Total 110 69 18 28 10 235
approximately log-normal distribution, with a
mean of $37,531, and a range from $300 to
$1.5 million.34
Business establishments surveyed are gen-
erally young, presumably reflecting the high
turnover typically found among small business-
es.  Table 12 gives the age breakdown.35ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 16
TABLE 13
Resident Nonresident
Hispanic Hispanic White Asian Arab Total
Number of cases 16.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 2.0 27.0
Percent of sample 14.5 5.8 11.1 10.7 20.0 11.5
Bank loans in financing business start-ups
In many (but not all) cases, individuals appear
to have succeeded in raising similar amounts of
capital elsewhere.  There is an extreme selec-
tion bias, however, in that only
current business owners are consid-
ered.  In contrast, table 16 details
reasons for not starting a business
by households that had previously
taken steps toward starting a busi-
ness but had not done so.  Of these
57 households, 28 cite either lack
of money or actual loan rejection,
suggesting that financing con-
straints are in fact widespread.
Fact 4:  When bank loans are
used, they are relatively large.
Figure 6 shows that bank loans are
only used for businesses with start-
up costs close to $10,000 and
above.  Even in this range, most
businesses are still financed with-
out bank capital.  Moreover, there
does not appear to be any systemat-
ic relation between proportion of
start-up costs financed by bank capital and
start-up costs.
Evidently then, the role of banks in small
business financing is limited in the Little
Village.37  So where are these businesses ob-
taining start-up capital?  Table 17 displays
sources of financing by ethnicity.
The striking result is that a minority of
businesses (92 out of the 221 completing this
section, or 41.6 percent) used any kind of loan
to finance start-up costs.  In contrast, as is
FIGURE 6








Bank loans and rejection incidence
Resident Nonresident
Hispanic Hispanic White Asian Arab Total
No bank loan
Suffered rejection 7 3 0 1 0 11
Never applied 83 60 10 24 7 184
Have bank loan
Suffered rejection 5 1 0a 00 6
Did not suffer rejection 11 3 1 3 2 20
Minimum rejection ratio 12/28 4/8 0/1 1/4 0/2 17/43
As percentage 42.9 50.0 0 25.0 0 39.5
aThere was one case of a white business owner suffering rejection from a government agency.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 17
TABLE 15
Outcomes for business respondents who suffered loan rejection
Actual Rejected
start-up loan
ID Ethnicity cost application Outcome
(---dollars in thousands---)
73 Hispanic 21.3 20 Gift of $8K from immediate family, $13.3K savings.
48 Hispanic 0.62 10 $620 savings.
61 Hispanic 9.2 50 $9.2K personal savings.
206 Hispanic 4 ? $4K savings.
101 Hispanic 2.5 5 $500 supplier’s credit, $2K savings.
95 Hispanic 17 10 $7K bank loan, $10K savings.
23 Hispanic 8 25 $3K loan from friends/associates, $5K supplier’s credit.
88 Hispanic 15 15 $15K loan from immediate family.
54 Hispanic 50 3 $42K bank loan, $3K loan from friends/associates, $5K savings.
72 Hispanic 60 160 $34K bank loan, $14K from friends/associates, $12K savings.
98 Hispanic 100 20 $110K bank loan, $20K mortgage, $10K savings.
5 Hispanic 515.6 180 $200K bank loan, $50K mortgage, $20K loan from immediate
    family, $20K loan from friends/associates, $225.6 savings.
188 Hispanic(NR) 30 25 $15K gift from immediate family, $15K personal savings.
81 Hispanic(NR) 2.1 5 $2.1K personal savings.
104 Hispanic(NR) 13.1 10 $5K supplier’s credit, $8.1K savings.
67 Hispanic(NR) 59.4 25 $25K bank loan, $34.4K savings.
65 Asiana 34 25 $13K loan from friends/associates, $6K supplier’s
    credit, $75K savings.
165 Whiteb 383.7 ? $280K bank loan, $103.7K other gifts.
aInterviewers attempted to ensure that start-up funds and costs were within 10 percent.  These efforts were generally successful.
 bFrom government agency.
? = no response.
NR = Nonresident.




Personal commitment/personal problem 4
No money 26
Lack of proper certificate/license 4
Family commitments 5
Family opposition 1
Did not know how to start 1
Always postpone a decision/fear of risk 5
Wasn’t serious 1
Had another job 1
Loan application denied 2
Problems with prospective partners 2
Other 1
Legal problems 1
Lack of family help 1
Recession in economy 1
Used money for something else 1
Total 57
Note: First response given to this question by each household.
shown in table 18, 49.5 percent of
respondents used only personal
resources, principally personal
savings, to start their business.
Table 19 gives reasons given
for not trying to get some kind of
loan.  The salient feature is that
the majority response is “lack of
need,” with only 21 citing lack of
credit-worthiness or information,
or an expectation of denial.  These
responses suggest that the wide-
spread absence of loaned start-up
capital is of the respondents’ own
choosing.  Consistent with this,
only 16 business respondents from
the whole sample cited lack of
financing as their biggest problem
in starting a business.
Nonetheless, the “lack of
need” response seems surprising.
We would expect bigger businessesECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 18
TABLE 17
Number of businesses receiving different forms of start-up finance
Resident Nonresident
Hispanic Hispanic White Asian Arab Total
Loans
Bank loan 16 4 2 3 2 27
Private lenders 2 1 0 1 0 4
Mortgage 2 1 1 1 0 5
Government program 1 1
Supplier’s credit 7 7 1 5 20
Ethnic association 1 1
Other private sources 1 1
Borrowed from immediate family 14 6 3 1 0 24
Borrowed from other relatives 8 1 1 4 0 14
Borrowed from friends or
   business associates 9 5 1 5 1 21
Total informal loansa 26 11 5 9 1 52
Total loans 45 22 9 13 3 92
Gifts
From immediate family 5 3 2 1 11
From friends 2 2
Other gifts 1 1
Total gifts 6 3 1 2 1 13
Personal resources
Personal savings 90 58 5 22 6 181
Credit cards 0 3 0 1 0 4
Loans from other
       businesses/inventory 2 3 0 2 1 8
Total personal resources 92 60 5 25 7 189
Partner’s contribution 6 10 1 0 1 18
Other 4 3 1 1 0 9
Total responses 106 67 11 28 9 221
aDefined here as borrowing from any family member, friend, or business associate.
Note: Because multiple responses are considered, sum of responses is greater than total households responding.
to be more profitable and would-be entrepre-
neurs to prefer to eliminate the “saving period”
before going into business.  We offer the fol-
lowing hypotheses to explain the predominance
of this response:
Hypothesis 1:  Business start-up is part of
a long-term plan and entrepreneurs need to
accumulate experience, as well as physical capi-
tal.  Hence, businesses either start very small to
provide a training in business or business own-
ers acquire the necessary training elsewhere,
accumulating savings at the same time.
Hypothesis 2:  The quantity of start-up
capital is essentially irrelevant, because there
TABLE 18
Resident Nonresident
Hispanic Hispanic White Asian Arab Total
Number 55.0 34.0 2.0 13.0 5.0 109.0
Percent of those answering section 51.9 50.7 18.2 46.4 55.6 49.3
Businesses started entirely with personal resourcesFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 19
TABLE 19
Why did you not ask for financial assistance for business start-up?
Resident Nonresident
hispanic hispanic White Asian Arab Total
Lack of credit/bad credit 3 3 0 0 0 6
Lack of information/bank contact 2 1 0 1 0 4
Lack of need 40 24 2 10 3 79
I wouldn’t get it anyway 3 3 0 4 1 11
Didn’t want to owe money 3 4 0 1 1 9
Preferred to start small 0 1 0 0 0 1
Too risky 1 1 0 0 0 2
There are a lot of problems
   trying to get a loan 1 2 0 0 0 3
Interest rates too high 1 3 0 0 1 5
Other 0 1 0 0 0 1
Didn’t want U.S. responsibilities 1 0 0 0 0 1
Lack of property 1 0 0 0 0 1
Did not occur to me 2 0 0 0 0 2
Total 58 43 2 16 6 125
Notes: Sample of businesses started without a loan from any source.
First response given to this question by each household.
are a variety of businesses, some of which
offer high returns to human capital and require
little physical capital.
Hypothesis 3:  Business ventures are sub-
ject to considerable risk, and even with infor-
mal community-based loans, individuals are
unable to obtain sufficient insurance (this will
be especially difficult if the family is taken as
the risk-sharing decision unit).  Alternatively,
informal loans, while theoretically capable of
supplying the necessary insurance, are simply
not available in the required quantities.  In either
case, the result is that individuals prefer to limit
their exposure in the small business sector.
Hypothesis 1 has some support from the
work of Tienda and Raijman (1996) on the
Little Village Surveys. They interpret the wide-
spread existence of part-time self-employment
at the household level as acting in part as busi-
ness training.  In this regard, we add only that
we find 46 business owners whose own employ-
ees have subsequently started their own busi-
ness, 43 of them in the same business sector.
Hypotheses 2 and 3 are discussed further
in the start-up costs section.  We would note
that limited amounts of capital in the informal
sector appears the most compelling explana-
tion.  That is, individuals would like to borrow
more, but only using contracts with a consider-
able degree of insurance.  The only loans of
sufficient size available are generally those
from the formal sector, but these come with too
few contingencies.  Consequently, individuals
decide to limit their risk by starting small, and
report “lack of need” when asked why they did
not borrow funds.  If this explanation is accu-
rate, the implication is that instead of pressuring
banks to increase existing business loans, legis-
lation should instead encourage the adoption of
more innovative lending schemes that use com-
munity monitoring and enforcement to mimic
the informal lending sector.
Start-up financing, profit levels, and ethnicity
Table 20 summarizes start-up costs and
profits of businesses surveyed.  We would note
that the profit data are likely to be very noisy,
due to a possible lack of accurate accounting
and to conceptual difficulties in separating out
business from personal expenses (such as prop-
erty or transportation used for both purposes).
At least across ethnic groups, start-up
capital appears to be positively correlated with
profit levels.  These findings are supported by
regressing profit levels on start-up costs and
racial dummy variables.  The results are dis-
played in table 21.  An interesting feature is that
although nonresident Hispanics report start-up
costs similar to those of resident Hispanics, their
profits are actually higher than those of Asians,
despite the latter having much higher start-up
inputs.  Hence, when profitability is considered,ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 20
TABLE 20
Start-up costs and reported profit levels
Resident Nonresident
Hispanic Hispanic White Asian Arab Total
Total start-up costs
Number of observations 106 65 10 28 9 218
25th percentile  $3,500  $4,500 $10,000 $8,500 $15,000  $4,700
Median 8,845 10,500 59,100 30,000 25,000 10,000
75th percentile 22,000 28,050 100,000 66,000 41,000 31,000
Mean 22,800 24,500 224,000 46,500 69,800 37,500
Reported profits, including
owner’s salary
Number of observations 65 42 6 19 7 139
25th percentile $15,000 $30,000 $22,000  $25,000 $31,000 $20,400
Median 28,000 44,900 43,000 30,000 42,000 35,000
75th percentile 39,000 62,000 152,000 54,000 49,000 49,000
Mean 32,600 54,947 249,000 47,000 40,100 51,000
Reported profits, excluding
owner’s salary
Number of observations 66 42 5 20 7 140
25th percentile $10,000 $15,000 $32,000 $20,200 $19,000 $12,000
Median 15,000 25,000 54,000 26,000 25,000 20,000
75th percentile 23,000 45,000 147,000 42,500 40,000 39,000
Mean 20,400 30,900 251,000 40,900 30,100 35,200
Number of businesses
reporting no profits or losses 14 4 3 0 0 21
Asians appear to fall back and nonresident
Hispanics to move ahead, while other groups
appear to maintain their relative positions.
Note also that even though resident Hispanic
profits are low compared with those of other
groups, they are high compared with the
household income figures reported in table 1.
Dropping the ethnic dummy variables has
almost no effect on the results, scarcely sur-
prising given the huge confidence intervals
associated with them.  Using a profits measure
that excludes the owner’s salary reduces the
estimate of the coefficient on start-up costs by
about 0.1, but otherwise has little effect.  The
main finding of the regression is that each
extra dollar invested in the business increases
annual profits by $0.70, strong evidence that
higher start-up costs are better.  We interpret
this as a rejection of hypothesis 2 of the pre-
ceding section.
As shown in table 20, the cross-ethnic
differences in size of start-up costs are striking.
TABLE 21
Regression of reported profits on start-up costs
Variable Coefficient T-statistics 95% confidence interval
Start-up cost .739 22.4 (.674,  .805)
Hispanic resident 19,233 .798 (–28,424,  66,891)
Hispanic nonresident 35,891 1.48 (–12,053,  83,835)
White, dummy variable set to zero
Asian 1,255 .450 (–38,240,  60,750)
Arab 18,717 .655 (–37,843,  75,277)
Constant –1,367 –.058 (–48,351,  45,618)
Notes: Dependent variable = reported profits, including owner’s salary.
Observations = 136
R2 = 0.836FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 21
The order (ascending) is resident Hispanics,
nonresident Hispanics, Asians/Arabs, and
whites.  Given the potential desirability of
higher capital investment, this raises the issue
of how some ethnic groups are able to obtain
substantially larger funds than others.  Table
22 itemizes the mean percentage contribution
of each source of start-up capital, with averag-
es taken over ethnic groups.
As in table 17, it is evident that whites
depend to a much lesser extent than other
groups on personal resources—whites obtain
an average of only 25 percent from personal
resources, whereas for other groups this source
contributes between 58 percent and 68 percent
of costs.  A large amount of this difference is
accounted for by the much larger amounts of
financing that whites obtain from their imme-
diate family.  Somewhat contrary to popular
perception, bank loans play a larger role for
resident Hispanics (8.9 percent) than for non-
resident Hispanics and Asians (2.9 percent
each).  Close inspection also reveals that
Asians obtain more funds from relatives out-
side the immediate family and from friends and
business associates than Hispanics do, and less
from immediate family.  In general, though,
the importance of different sources does not
differ dramatically across ethnic groups.
Given the differences in start-up costs,
the similarities in the use of different credit
sources mean that Asians and Arabs are sim-
ply investing more personal savings and bor-
rowing larger amounts than Hispanics.  While
it may be that these groups are just more will-
ing to expose themselves to risk in the small
business sector, either because of greater skill
and/or experience or because of a greater
TABLE 22
Mean proportion of start-up costs from each source
Resident Nonresident
Hispanic Hispanic White Asian Arab Total
Loans
Bank loan .089 .029 .115 .029 .21 .070
Private lenders .012 .014 0 .010 0 .011
Mortgage .002 .009 .08 .007 0 .009
Government program .009 0 0 0 0 .005
Supplier’s credit .035 .067 .042 .079 0 .049
Ethnic association 0 0 0 .006 0 .001
Other private sources .004 0 0 0 0 .002
Immediate family .059 .039 .273 .012 0 .055
Other relatives .031 .006 .083 .104 0 .035
Friends or business associates .033 .029 .024 .059 .098 .037
Total informal loansa .123 .074 .390 .176 .098 .127
Total loans .275 .194 .651 .307 .307 .275
Gifts
From immediate family .023 .023 0 .056 .052 .027
From friends .005 0 0 0 0 .003
Other gifts 0 0 .023 0 0 .001
Total gifts .028 .023 .022 .056 .052 .031
Personal resources
Personal savings .648 .624 .247 .619 .470 .610
Credit cards 0 .016 0 .005 0 .005
Loans from other
   businesses/inventory .010 .031 0 .065 .111 .027
Total personal resources .658 .672 .247 .688 .581 .643
Partner’s contribution .025 .067 .042 0 .059 .036
Other .012 .024 .021 .012 0 .016
Total responses 106 67 11 28 9 221
aDefined here as borrowing from any family member, friend, or business associate.ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 22
“entrepreneurial” spirit (much cited in the
popular press, but receiving no support from
our survey), it seems more likely that these
groups simply have more personal savings and
have connections with people with greater
funds to lend.  As supporting (but certainly not
conclusive) evidence, we offer the findings that
Asians appear more risk averse, make more use
of own-ethnicity supply networks, and talk to a
“wider” network of people before starting a
business than do other groups.  These findings
are outlined below.
In the following discussion, we place rela-
tively little emphasis on the Arab and white
groups.  The former sample is especially small,
making generalizations difficult.  Given the
extreme underrepresentation of white-owned
businesses in the Little Village relative to the
ethnic composition of Chicago (around 40
percent of the Chicago city population is
white), we conjecture those businesses are not
representative of white-owned businesses in
general.  We also find it striking that our sam-
ple does not include a single African-American
owned business, although nearly 40 percent of
the Chicago population is black and the neigh-
borhoods immediately to the north of South
Lawndale are principally black.
Certainly, small businesses are a risky
proposition.  Of the 235 businesses surveyed,
62 reported having been in danger of failing in
the last three years.38  Responding to these
downturns, 25 businesses had reduced house-
hold consumption, 16 had delayed or failed to
pay debts, and 27 had reduced input expenses.
TABLE 23
Attitudes to risk: How willing would you be to risk your home and all your
possessions in borrowing money to start another business?
Given this risk, would-be entrepreneurs
certainly have reason to be wary of loan con-
tracts with few contingencies.  Nonetheless, as
indicated in table 23, business respondents
expressed a surprising willingness to risk ev-
erything in order to finance another business.
Moreover, there is no evidence of greater risk
aversion amongst Hispanics—indeed, Asians
and whites appear considerably less willing to
take risks.  Although Asian business owners do
appear more experienced in business, previous
experience (like all other variables tested) had
no significance in predicting total start-up
investment.39
Table 24 details the use of own-ethnicity
supply networks.  Clearly, Asian and white
respondents are substantially more likely to
deal only with their own ethnic group than are
Hispanics and Arabs.  We are inclined to inter-
pret the white number as an artifact of the
numerical superiority of whites in Chicago—
consistent with this, no white respondent with
only white suppliers cites “language or trust”
as the reason.40  On the other hand, five of the
Asian respondents and six of the resident His-
panics (though none of the nonresident Hispan-
ics) give this response.  Table 24 also details
how many of the suppliers associated with
each ethnic group of respondents are located in
the Little Village.  Fewer than 10 percent of
the total number of suppliers used are located
in the neighborhood.  Also, the use of “local”




Resident Nonresident Total Total
Hispanic Hispanic White Asian Arab (businesses) (households)
Not at all willingb 22.7 33.3 38.9 17.9 60.0 28.1 58.2
Not very willingb 12.7 13.0 22.2 28.6 0.0 14.9 10.8
Neither willing
   nor unwillingb 2.7 2.9 5.6 17.9 0.0 4.7 16.0
Somewhat willingb 22.7 17.4 27.8 21.4 10.0 20.9 4.9
Very willingb 39.1 33.3 5.6 14.3 30.0 31.5 10.2
Total responding 110 69 18 28 10 235 325
aHouseholds asked if they would risk their house and possessions to start a new business.
bFigures as percentages of total responding.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 23
TABLE 24
Supply networks used by respondents
Resident Nonresident
Ethnicity of respondent Hispanic Hispanic White Asian Arab Total
All suppliers mentioned by
respondent of same ethnicity
as respondent 18 9 7 11 1 46
As percentage of respondents 16.7 13.6 41.2 39.3 11.1 20.2
Number of suppliers mentioned
who are based in Little Village 23 18 3 0 0 44
As percentage of total suppliers 9.0 11.2 7.0 0 0 7.9
Total responding 108 66 17 28 9 228
Total number of suppliers mentioned 255 161 43 72 25 556
TABLE 25
Who did business owners talk to before going into business?
Resident Nonresident
Hispanic Hispanic White Asian Arab Total
Family member 74 43 10 11 5 143
Friend 19 8 3 6 3 39
Professional associate 8 5 2 4 0 19
Unspecified acquaintance 1 3 0 3 0 7
Total responding 102 59 15 24 8 208
Nonfamily contacts
Contacts of same ethnicity 24 15 3 11 3 56
As percentage 85.7 93.8 60.0 84.6 100 86.2
Contacts of different ethnicity 4 1 2 2 0 9
Of whom # Hispanic na na 1 1 0 na
Contact lives in Little Village 15 8 1 2 1 27
Contact lives in respondent’s
   neighborhood 15 0 2 0 0 17
Contact lives elsewhere 13 8 3 11 2 37
Total nonfamily 28 16 5 13 3 65
Note: Responses restricted to first contact cited by each respondent.
The findings on supply networks indicate
that compared with other groups, Asians are
more inclined to use suppliers of their own
ethnicity and also favor a greater geographical
dispersion of their suppliers.  Because of the
substantial stratification of ethnic groups into
different business types, it is hard to dismiss the
possibility that this merely reflects a tendency
for Asians to operate businesses in sectors
which happen to have Asian suppliers not locat-
ed in the Little Village.  Nonetheless, we are
inclined to the view that Asians tend to be part
of city-wide networks of Asian entrepreneurs.
A similar story emerges from the pattern of
who business owners talked to before going into
business.  Table 25 displays a summary of char-
acteristics of these “contacts.”
Asians tend to cite family members less
than other ethnic groups and friends and associ-
ates more.42  The type of associate cited also
appears a little different—whereas Hispanics
refer to coworkers and employers (past and
present), Asians cite a supplier and other busi-
ness owners as their professional associates.
All groups except for whites appear to strongly
favor their own ethnic group, even when consid-
eration is restricted to nonfamily contacts.
There is some slight evidence that when whites
and Asians depart from this pattern it is to consult
Hispanics (presumably to gain specific “cultural”ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 24
knowledge), but the numbers involved are very
small.  Only resident Hispanics show much
evidence of restricting their contacts to those in
close proximity.43  However, this may be driven
more by a desire to speak to people who live in
the area of the planned business than to a greater
tendency to talk to neighbors.  Consistent with
this explanation, nonresident Hispanics cite
Little Village residents in about the same propor-
tion as resident Hispanics.  In contrast, there
does not appear to be any geographic pattern in
the residency of those cited by Asians.
The data appear to support the idea that
Asians tend to belong to a (loosely defined)
nonfamily business network that is geographi-
cally and occupationally dispersed, but ethni-
cally restricted.  As noted earlier, table 22
shows that individuals outside the immediate
family (such as more distant relatives, friends
and associates, and suppliers) are more impor-
tant in financing start-up costs for Asian busi-
nesses than for those of other ethnic groups.
Recalling the relatively high start-up costs of
these businesses, we are inclined to think that
Asian networks consist of a broader spectrum
of contacts than the tighter family networks that
Hispanics appear to use and, moreover, that
these broader networks are able to mobilize
larger amounts of capital.
We acknowledge two broad classes of po-
tential criticism of this view.  One, which we
discussed above, is that either because of less
experience or a culturally induced higher aver-
sion to risk, Hispanics are simply less willing to
make large investments in small business enter-
prises.  As noted, however, we find no evidence
of differing attitudes to risk.  The second poten-
tial criticism is that for some self-selection rea-
son, the Asians doing business in the Little Vil-
lage have greater personal wealth than their
Hispanic peers.44  If, as seems likely, individuals
tend to know people of similar wealth levels, the
ability of Asians to acquire greater funds from
personal networks may reflect more the advan-
tage of being part of a generally wealthy network
than of a diversified one per se.  However, this
would in no way change the desirability of at-
tempting to inject larger amounts of formal sec-
tor capital into informal networks.
Conclusion
To summarize, we find that the formal fi-
nancial sector is little used either for consump-
tion smoothing or small business start-ups in the
Little Village neighborhood of Chicago.  In
contrast, mortgages from formal sector institu-
tions play a very significant role in financing
house buying, though even here there is greater
use of informal loans and personal savings than
we might have expected.
There is evidence that a lack of financial
instruments exists in the community.  Large
numbers of households appear able to respond
to financial shocks only by reducing consump-
tion or increasing labor effort.  Businesses
appear credit constrained in start-up financing,
in the sense that the estimated returns to each
dollar invested are very high.  Yet this appar-
ent lack of instruments coexists with a general
lack of interest in the services of formal sector
institutions.  Our tentative interpretation of
these findings is that formal sector financial
instruments are insufficiently flexible, where-
as informal sector funds are insufficient to
meet all needs.  We are inclined to view the
small role played by the formal sector as stem-
ming, at least in part, from community disin-
terest as opposed to formal sector negligence.
We have suggested that Asian business
networks are more diversified geographically,
occupationally, and outside the family than
Hispanic business networks.  In both cases,
networks are ethnically homogeneous.  On the
household level, it appears that relatively poor
and unintegrated households are the most
likely to receive financial assistance from
friends.  For all households, family assistance
plays an important role.  We know nothing at
present about the informal networks of Asians
who are not business owners in the Little Vil-
lage.  Likewise, we know nothing about Afri-
can-American informal networks of any kind,
and next to nothing about white networks.
Characterizations of these groups would be
necessary to understand the extent to which
our findings are specific to Little Village His-
panics and business owners.
With some caution, we suggest that for-
mal sector institutions attempt to create more
flexible financial instruments by either using
or mimicking existing informal and semi-
formal structures.  We are unable, at this
point, to make specific suggestions as to how
this might be achieved in practice.
In conclusion, we wish to stress the impor-
tance of moving away from narrowly focused
discussions concerning the quantity of bank
lending activity in marginalized communitiesFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 25
poor and minority groups, we suggest there is
much evidence for the view that at least as
great a problem concerns the actual desirability
of existing loan instruments.
toward a more careful consideration of the
quality of loan instruments.  While we do not
doubt that improvements are possible in the
accessibility of the formal financial sector to
NOTES
1“The Little Village survey,” conducted 1994-95 under the
direction of Richard Taub, Marta Tienda, and Robert
Townsend through the Center for the Study of Urban
Inequality, University of Chicago.
2This framework was first considered by Arrow (1964) and
Debreu (1959).
3This framework has been developed and tested by Altonji,
Hayashi, and Kotlikoff (1992), Altug and Miller (1990),
Cochrane (1991), Mace (1991), and Townsend (1994).
4See for instance Brewer and Genay (1994), Dubey, Geana-
koplos, and Shubik (1989), Mueller and Townsend (1995),
and Rashid and Townsend (1994).
5Discussed and empirically examined by Deaton (1989) and
Zeldes (1989).
6There remains the interesting question of what is actually
meant by the term “formal.”  Aside from physical require-
ments (such as offices), a characterization suggested by
informational theory is that the lender have no costless
information about the borrower’s actions.  Perhaps it is best
to simply note that credit and insurance services can be
provided by a diverse set of “institutions,” ranging from
immediate family through credit unions and rotating credit
associations to formal banks.
7See for instance Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Williamson
(1986).  Of course the simplest rationale for credit rationing
would be the existence of legal restrictions on interest rates.
Although such restrictions do not exist in the U.S., one might
conjecture that public pressure plays a similar role.
8Though as there are a large number of different banks, it is
not clear why all would avoid certain communities.
9See for example Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990), Prescott
and Townsend (1995), Rai (1996), and Varian (1990).
10That is, those interviewed.
11In the same data set, Tienda and Raijman (1996) find that
close to 20 percent of working age adults in households
sampled are involved in some form of self-employment
activity, though much of it part-time.
12These latter two census figures are percentages of only
those working.
13Because multiple responses from each household are
considered, the sum of the responses is greater than the
total number of households responding.  This is true for
many of the tables presented.
14We have excluded transfer payments here because of
concern that they are chronic rather than a response to
particular shocks.  Including them would increase the
number obtaining new financial assistance to 139, or 65.6
percent.
15This category is not intended to include loans from
family or friends, and any miscategorized responses were
corrected.
16It is perhaps interesting that five of these households cited
the bank contact as being a friend or relative.
17The exceptions are the workplace loan, the “other” source,
the individual who appears to be operating as a private
lender (a “loan shark”?), and the three credit unions (in
some sense an intermediate case).
18An interesting interpretation suggested by the theories
summarized in the first section is that formal loans enter
the community through a relatively small number of indi-
viduals in relatively large amounts, to be subsequently
distributed more widely through informal networks.  How-
ever, tables 4 and 5 suggest that households obtaining
different types of financial assistance do respond in differ-
ent ways to shocks.
19The numbers of households suffering financial difficulty
from each quartile are 59, 47, 55, and 44, respectively.
20The numbers of households suffering financial difficulty
from each proficiency level are 122, 50, and 39, respective-
ly, compared with population numbers of 178, 75, and 71.
21The group sizes are 140, 26, and 47, respectively, with
population numbers 205, 47, and 75.
22Specifically, the services are (a) schools, (b) church/
temple, (c) grocery shopping, (d) clothes shopping, (e)
movies, (f) dining, (g) medical services, (h) legal and
business services, (i) banking, (j) financial services, (k)
drug stores, (l) entertainment, (m) personal services, and
each service used outside the neighborhood adds one to the
index. The group sizes are 58, 54, 60, and 40, respectively,
with population numbers 86, 70, 99, and 72.
23Though even with such data the problem is not trivial, as
illustrated by the heated debate that followed the Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston study by Munnell et al. (1992),
which essentially attempted to estimate just such a model.
As noted earlier, at least part of the problem with such an
exercise is that the very decision to approach the bank may
reflect private characteristics unobserved by the econome-
trician.
24This compares to a figure of 46 percent reported for
greater Chicago area Hispanics by the Metro Chicago
Information Center.
25For instance, undocumented residents may either be
unable to open bank accounts, or fearful of doing so.  The
survey deliberately avoided questions related to the legal
status of residents, for fear of affecting the response rate/
reliability.
26The associated figure for greater Chicago Hispanics is 55
percent (Metro Chicago Information Center).
27The Woodstock Institute (1992) reports a figure of 37.2
percent for the Little Village in 1990.
28Details are not presented here.ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 26
29Of the remaining seven, three previously said they had
borrowed money from someone, three mentioned “revolv-
ing loans,” one referred to an “other” source, and one
mentioned receiving a repayment of a loan from an unrelat-
ed individual.
30See Essig, Grimes, and Woos (1995).  The survey data
also contain rejection rates loans for car purchase, applianc-
es, home expansion, home equity, and education.  With the
exception of home expansion loans, the rejection rates in
these cases are relatively low.
31For example, relatively common businesses include
restaurants, bars, auto repair shops, and hair salons.  Rela-
tively uncommon businesses include bridal shops, bakeries,
iron works, and factories.
32Moreover, most health clinics located in the Little Village
are affiliated with a major hospital or the City of Chicago.
33Note that we have divided the Hispanic group into resi-
dent (in Little Village) and nonresident groups.  There are
strong grounds for supposing that these two groups may
differ in motivation for business ownership, experience,
integration into U.S. society, etc.  To consider whether
Asians are overrepresented in Little Village businesses, the
following rough calculation is interesting: There are about
100,000 Asians in Chicago, so accounting for a business
sampling rate of one in three, approximately one in every
1,200 has a business in the Little Village.  Since there are
77 neighborhoods in Chicago, as defined by the Community
Lending Factbook (The Woodstock Institute, 1992), if the
Little Village were typical this ratio would imply that one
in every 16 Asians has a business in some neighborhood.
This is still a lower proportion than most estimates of Asian
self-employment rates, indicating that compared with other
neighborhoods the number of Asian businesses in the Little
Village is not particularly high.  In comparison, 15 out of
327 Little Village household respondents reported self-
employment (one in 22), of whom two owned businesses
outside the Little Village (one in 166).
34In figures, we will generally omit the $1.5 million case in
an effort to enhance readability.
35Note that the survey was conducted mainly in 1993–94,
which accounts for the smaller number of businesses dating
from 1993 onwards.
36To calculate the rejection rate, the number of households
with a bank loan but who have previously experienced
rejection is doubled to account for the fact they must have
applied for loans at least twice.
37Formal sector loans are a little more prevalent once busi-
nesses are established: for their last two years of operation,
businesses reported receiving 30 loans from banks, three
from finance companies, one from a mortgage company, two
from credit unions, five from suppliers, two from credit
cards, two from individuals, and one from a rotating credit
organization.  Associated rejections were six, one, one, zero,
one, zero, zero, and zero, respectively.
38Moreover, since our sample does not contain any busi-
nesses that actually did fail, this clearly understates the
risk.  Even in the period between drawing the initial sample
and interviewing, more than 10 percent of the selected
businesses closed.
39Approximately one-third of the sample had previous
business experience, whereas two-thirds of Asian business
owners reported having previously owned a business.
40Though this raises again the issue of the complete absence
of African-American business owners, despite the fact that
they make up an almost equal proportion of the Chicago
city population as whites.
41Interestingly, there are eight suppliers named by nonresi-
dent Hispanics who are located in the same neighborhood
as the business owner, a pattern that is not found for the
other ethnic groups.
42In fact, compared with other groups, Asians also appear to
prefer to talk to siblings over spouses and parents.
43Although two out of five contacts cited by whites live in
the respondent’s neighborhood, the sample is very thin.
44This is clearly supported by the greater personal invest-
ments in Asian businesses.
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